Introduction
In 1981 the OECD published the proceedings of a conference held one year earlier with the title The Welfare State in Crises. Twenty years later worries about the future of the welfare state are still a priority on policymaker's agenda.
Matters of financial unavailability still represent the number one priority for those countries, which have not gone through any major step in reforming entitlement and computational rules of the fundamental social security programmes.
More importantly, however, policymakers are now realizing that the same factors, which threaten the financial stability of the welfare state, also represent a menace for the ideal of social integration that the welfare state -as a post war institutional creation -aimed at realising. New social cleavages are emerging, splitting middle-class western society in a world of 2/3 winners and a growing group of labour market outsiders or working poor. During the last decades, concerns about growing unemployment have led to significant reforms in welfare provisions, aiming at incentivating labour market participation. Unemployment rates have experimented significant reduction during the 90's, especially in those countries which have undergone major liberalization of labour markets during the 80's, but questions arise of whether massive subsidising of a growing stock of "hamburger-flippers" may be regarded as an optimal answer to the challenge of next decade's welfare state reforms (Ferrera, 1998) .
As pointed out by many scholars, no ad hoc measure is likely to solve the welfare state crises. Significantly the proceedings of the 1996 OECD social policy conference were published one year later under the title Family, market and community (OECD, 1997) : family, market and state represent fundamental institutions for the welfare of persons, but these institutions are systematically interwoven and interact in complex ways in the production and distribution of welfare. Rebuilding the new welfare state of the 21 st century means to understand how the different institutions interact and understand how different social policies may affect welfare. Indeed, this means reshaping social policy in order to prevent people from falling in the so-called "welfare traps" (e.g. abstaining from labour market participation in order not to lose higher than wage unemployment benefits), encouraging "workfare" or "welfare to work" solutions, but it also means reshaping social policy in order to prevent people from falling into "family traps" (e.g. not being able to conciliate parental care-giving duties with labour market participation responsibilities) or "market traps" (e.g. not being able to exit the low skill, low wage segment of labour market).
It is widely believed that the typical compensatory monetary support given by welfare states institutions to needing people, insured workers or simply citizens is destined to be drastically scaled back. Quite differently from the post-war social and economical background -it is claimed -today families need non-monetary support, mainly in the form of active labour market policies, employment-friendly family policies, family services, education and training services, support to labour mobility, and so on.
In other words, the new welfare state should be able to change from a transfer based welfare system into a service based welfare system. This, in turn, might mean reducing the redistributional impact of social policy as increasing resources would be shifted away from monetary transfers to public services, although the distributional implications of equilibrating the transfer bias of most western countries' welfare states is yet all but clear.
On the one hand, expanding the range of welfare state services to workers, especially to young families, may result in increased labour market participation, concentrated in the low family disposable income quintiles, who encounter harder problems in combining working and care-giving responsibilities. On the other hand, the emphasis on active labour market policies, education and mobility services is likely to decrease life-cycle welfare inequalities, as low wage and unemployed workers' chances of experimenting upward mobility may be enhanced. A shift away from the transfer bias may therefore imply drastic redefinition of welfare states' "commitment to equality" (Esping-Andersen, 1997b, p. 74) .
As argued by Sen (1994) , each normative theory of social order requires the promotion of equality in some space which is held as critical by the majority of the people. According to Sen's view there are no egalitarian and anti-egalitarian theories of social orders, but only different ways of conceiving the space in which equality should be evaluated. Shifting from transfers to services may therefore be perceived as a way of redefining welfare states' commitment to equality from a "here and now" perspective toward increased equality in the space of choice. At the same time, however, no equality of choice can exist without a minimum of equality in the space of opportunities, which again implies a minimum of equality in the space of income -as income and opportunities are mostly correlated phenomena.
From this perspective, the issue of child poverty becomes particularly relevant. Starting from the 1980's most industrialised countries have experienced a trend towards increasing child poverty, whereas poverty rates amongst elderly population have radically decreased (BradburyJäntti, 1999 , Förster, 1994 . Indeed, in most western European countries there are important signs of overprotection towards elderly population, as saving rates among families headed by pensioners typically experience higher saving rates than younger families.
Obviously, child poverty is an issue which naturally strikes human sense of solidarity, facing up even most fierce opponents of the welfare state with difficult ethical trade-offs.
Yet the problem of child poverty has not been evaluated with respect to the potential long run effects. Nevertheless, it seems at least likely that in the "digital divide" era, child poverty might have more far-reaching consequences than twenty years ago. As low living standards are all too often the main cause of temporary delays or long run impossibility in the acquisitions of even the most "fundamental capabilities" (Negri -Saraceno, 1996) , the chances that today's poor children will turn into "lifelong losers" should represent a concrete worry for policymakers and scholars.
The aim of this paper is to analyse poverty levels in six European countries, using crossnationally comparable data on households' income distribution drawn from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) database;
1 it mainly focuses on child poverty taking into account differences in demographic structure, actual redistribution policies towards younger households and family services aiming at increasing female labour market participation in the European Union.
The choice of the countries reflect the need of comparing different welfare regime typologies: according to Esping-Andersen's classification (Esping-Andersen, 1990 and EspingAndersen, 2000) the first four countries belong to the cluster of conservative welfare regime, 1 Data are collected at both household (family) and personal level (the latter being divided in two different groups depending on person's age). More than 100 socio-demographic variables and almost 50 economic variables are available at household level, whereas at person level the statistical information is slightly narrower (again, the same level of disagregation is not available for all datasets). For more detailed information about accessing and using the database, search through LIS's website at http://www.lis.ceps.lu/.
Sweden is a typical example of social democratic welfare regime, whereas the UK, after the welfare state's scale backs of the 80's, is usually regarded as a liberal welfare regime. Poverty line computed at different fractions of median household disposable income.
Household income adjusted through one dimensional equivalence scale.
Equivalence elasticity equal to 0,5 .
Poverty indices weighted with number of persons.
Measuring poverty in Europe in the 90's

Social transfers
Poverty is the outcome of various forces involving all institutions playing a central role in the production and distribution of welfare. 3 Poverty is often the outcome of labour market performance (creating high unemployment rates or paying lower than poverty line wages) or choices in family creation (and destruction) and consequent intra-household sharing of care-giving and working responsibilities. The state also plays an important role in the production and distribution of welfare and in contrasting poverty. With respect to poverty, the state's role has traditionally been analysed in terms of quantity of social transfers. Focusing only on transfers may indeed reveal little about the role of public policies in determining the pattern of poverty: as market performance, family choice and public policies are systematically interwoven, focusing on transfers may underestimate the effect of the state's intervention in determining the income distribution, particularly the so called primary or market income distribution. Transfers, nonetheless, do explain a large fraction in international poverty rates, as witnessed by the fact that pre-transfers poverty rates tend to have a much lower coefficient of variation than post-transfers poverty rates. Table 2 compares pre-transfers and post-transfers poverty rates. Poverty line computed at different fractions of median household disposable income.
Poverty reduction = [(pre-transfers-post-transfer)/pre-transfers*100]
What explains such a different performance? Graph 1 certainly tells part of the story: take up rates depend on the amount of resources available for social transfers: social democratic countries spend more and therefore cluster around high level of spending and high level of take up rate, conservative countries spend moderately less on social transfers and take up rate tend to slightly lower, whereas liberal countries spend significantly less on social transfers, achieving typically low performances on the take up rate. Note that we some other countries have been taken in, in order to increase the regression robustness (three countries have been added, one from each of the three welfare regimes).
Differences in spending tend to obscure significant differences in the structure of spending. It is by looking at the structure of spending that deeper differences between welfare states regimes tend to come up as well as plausible explanations for Italy's outlying position.
headcount ratio -a much handier poverty index -using a relative poverty line equal to 50% of median household disposable income, although aware of the potential drawbacks of such an approach. Table 3 shows income composition in the six countries considered. Note that as Netherlands occupational pensions are recorded by LIS as income coming from capital markets, Dutch data are therefore not fully comparable with those of the other countries (this explains the relatively high pre transfer income not coming from labour market and the correspondently low level of pensions). Total social transfers 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 Source: Own calculations on LIS micro data sets Notes: Mean household disposable income adjusted for size (equivalence elasticity=0,5) Differences between welfare state regimes appear more visible when the redistributional components are expressed as percentages of median household transfer income.
1. Sweden and the United Kingdom both share a less pronounced pension bias in their transfer system; whereas Germany, France allocate over 80% of their social transfers to pensions, the former two countries spend only around 60%; 2. unemployment benefits tend to be extremely generous in Sweden and significant in all conservative welfare state, whereas UK's liberal welfare regime assigns a very low fraction of transfer to the protection of unemployment risks; 3. family and child allowances vary remarkably between the different nations, it is however interesting to notice that their impact on disposable income is not that pronounced, ranging from little over 1 to less than 2% of household disposable income; 4. contrary to expectations, means-tested transfers are higher in Sweden than in the other central European countries, however both central European and Swedish figures may be considered marginal when compared with those of the United Kingdom;
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Italy differs from the other ideal-typical examples of conservative welfare regime (principally France and Germany): the extremely high percentage of total social transfers allocated to pensions crowds out social expenditure targeting younger households. Unemployment benefits are lower than in all other countries, there is no universal programme for family and child allowances, although employed workers may receive some means-tested support (which however increase less than proportionally with respect to family size), financed through workers' and employers' contributions and some regions have recently introduced limited means-tested social assistance for needing families. 6 The latter, however, are not recorded separately from earnings as entitled workers receive the benefits directly from employers. Also the means-tested transfers appear rather ungenerous when compared to those of other countries; the main protection instrument (the "Pensione Sociale"), moreover, is only available to old people who have not maturated the contribution requirements for receiving the old age pension.
Concluding, whereas the pension bias is generally strong in all conservative welfare regimes, the case of Italy is dramatic, since the growing percentage of public expenditure allocated to older households has progressively crowded out any form of support to younger households.
The consequences of theses different patterns in the structure of social transfers may be observed in graphs 2 and 3, where the income of different income deciles has been divided between the market component (augmented for sick pay and maternity allowances) and the social transfer component for households with head under 60 years and household with head over 67. The group between 61 and 66 has been excluded in order to have two homogeneous groups of working and retired households.
Differences between the alternative institutional settings appear clearly with respect to older households:
1. the British social transfer distribution is an outcome of social assistance in the lower part, public old age insurance in the middle and prevalence of private schemes in the upper part of the distribution; 2. the Swedish distribution is the outcome of its universal flat rate and occupational second tier old age benefits, with indeed very low reliance on market instruments (some market income is present in upper deciles, whereas in the lower deciles taxation on pension benefits tend to bring market income near to zero or even negative); 3. the three purest conservative welfare regimes show the typical correlation between market income and pension benefits as those who have paid higher contributions are also likely to have accumulated greater wealth during their working life (the correlation is extremely high in Italy where the computation rules were especially beneficial to upper class employees); 4. last, in the Dutch case, only the universal flat rate benefit is recorded as public transfer, while the occupational second tier pension benefits are included in market income.
Of most interest, with respect to the Italian experience, is the deciles composition of income in younger household. Most countries show here an almost lognormal distribution, as most social transfers tend to concentrate around the second and third income deciles. 7 International differences continue to stand out very clearly:
1. British transfers target only the lower deciles and tend to approach zero already starting from the 6 th income decile; 2. Swedish and Dutch transfers are more generous in all deciles of the income distribution, although they, too, concentrate in the first deciles; 3. France and Germany, at last, show a relatively lower concentration of income in the bottom deciles (as means-tested components are quite low) and is overall less generous than Sweden and the Netherlands towards younger households due to the transfer-bias. The Italian distribution of transfers to younger households is clearly the outcome of the transfer-structure outlined above. It is very difficult to trace a pattern of transfers across deciles. If anything there is, however, evidence of a small increase as one moves from lower deciles to upper deciles of income distribution. This may be a consequence of the extreme generosity of some pension schemes (especially tailored for public and other privileged workers) granting few workers early retirement (often even 50-55 years) with golden old age pensions.
Household structure
The transfers-structure outlined in the previous paragraph has a strong impact on social transfers' capacity of hedging some household typologies against poverty risks. Table 5 summarizes poverty rates (before and after transfers) 8 amongst some household typologies (some typically exposed to greater poverty risks lone mothers, lone women not in working age and household with no earning income and some characterized by low poverty risk, such as households with two or more earners and households headed by male in retirement), indicating for each typologies the percentage of people living in it and the percentage of total poverty explained.
It may be useful to summarize some of the evidence. 1. There is evidence of "genderdization" of poverty: households headed by non-working lone mothers naturally face the greatest poverty risk (ranging from 3 times the national averageas in the case of Sweden -to over 10 times the national average -as in the case of Germany). In most countries the impact of poverty amongst this typology may be considered marginal, as it explains only a small fraction of total poverty rates. A significant exception, however, is represented by the UK, where poverty rates amongst this particular household typology is responsible for 1/5 of total poverty rate. Lone working mothers also record higher than average poverty rates in the three "pure" conservative welfare regimes examined and in the Netherlands, although such household do not represent here a significant share of the population. Quite different is the situation in the UK and especially in Sweden where the presence of lone working mothers is more common and poverty rates are lower than national average (mainly due to higher targeting of social transfers). Lone women in retirement also register higher than average poverty risk in those countries where there is no universal old age pension system: only in Sweden and in the Netherlands poverty rates are lower than national average. It is not difficult to explain the evidence: in the three "pure" conservative welfare regimes, old age pensions are typically granted to workers who have long curricula of labour market participation. Care-giving responsibilities, however, often prevent women from continued presence on labour market, with negative consequences on the acquisition of old age pension entitlement. The same problem emerges in the UK where pensions schemes are based on a public/private mix, but still require longlasting contributions or earmarks.
Clearly in the 21
st century being old does not automatically mean being poor: households headed by a male pensioner systematically witness lower than average poverty risk. This is especially true in Sweden and Germany. Moreover, in a time series perspective, poverty rates among these household typologies have indeed shown significant decreases in the last ten years (with the exception of Britain). Take up rates are here all very high, ranging from above 80%, as in the British case, to almost 100%, as in the case of Sweden. Poverty rates are very low also amongst two or more breadwinner households. Clearly doubling the source of income is the best way of hedging against poverty risks. Poverty rates are here in the 1% range. The only exception is represented by Italy, where the take up rate for this household typology is just under 24%. 3. Households with no earning income also face very high poverty risk. Sweden stands out as the country with lowest poverty amongst this typology. As most households tend to rely on two incomes, the risk of having no earning income is significantly reduced. Moreover, generous universal unemployment benefits grant very high social transfers' take-up-rates (almost 90%). United Kingdom witnesses the worst performance: not only is the percentage of the population living in such households higher than in the rest of Europe (UK was severely hit by the recession of the early '90s -the 1991 LIS data show that in three years 2% of the population has passed in household with no earned income), but the take up rate also tend to be very low -as one would indeed expect from the low level of the unemployment benefits. The continental countries fare somewhere in between these two extremes, scoring take up rates in the 60-70% range. 4. Of greater importance to the continental welfare regimes, and indeed to Italy, however, are the poverty rates recorded by single breadwinner households. With the only exception of Sweden, between 17 and 30% of the population in Europe live in such households. Pretransfers poverty rates among such household do not diverge significantly; at post-transfers level, however, Italy diverges significantly from other countries recording a 21% poverty rate -almost twice that of the United Kingdom and seven times that of Germany. The very low take up rate, coupled with a greater presence of single (mostly male) breadwinner household are the main cause of Italian extremely high poverty rates, as the incidence of poverty amongst these household explains almost 45% of total Italian poverty rates.
Child poverty
The former analysis shows for Italy the strong impact of poverty amongst single male breadwinner households. What causes such high poverty rates? In table 6 the last two household typologies have been further disaggregated with respect to the number of children (0 to 18 years old) living in the household. Pre-transfer poverty rates tend to decrease when moving from households with no children to households with children. The latter may be seen as clear signs of households' strategies aiming at procrastinating family formation to a point where households' financial position appear more stable. However, with the only exception of Holland -where tax exemptions for large households tend to be more generous -poverty rates tend to increase as one moves from one child household towards households with 2 or 3 and more children.
Post-transfer poverty rates, nonetheless, witness significant reductions both in single breadwinner and two-earners households; this is especially true for very large households: as family size increases, in fact, social transfers tend in most countries to become more generous, with a positive impact on social transfers' take up rate. The only exception to this trend is represented by Italy, where the take up rate is negatively correlated with the size of the household. Whereas all the countries considered offer some mix of universal and means-tested benefits for families with children, the Italian welfare state only offers means-tested benefits to employees, which, however, are far from compensating for the costs of growing up children. The outcome of such setting has produced one of the highest child poverty rate in all the industrialized world. LIS data show this clearly: while in Sweden less than 3 children out of 100 may be considered poor, in the central European countries 1 child out of ten, in Italy and in the United Kingdom almost 2 children out of ten live under the poverty line.
Most worrying indeed, is the fact that the child poverty seems to follow, in Italy (as in the British case), a long run increasing trend, providing strong evidence that poverty is simply shifting away from often overprotected older households, towards younger households (see graph 4). Still a significant difference between the British and the Italian case must not be overlooked: while British families have grown less and less stable during last decades (the number of lone mothers has almost doubled), Italian families may still be considered extremely stable. Family stability, however, should not be taken for granted: even traditionally "familistic" countries, such as Germany, have in fact recently experienced a boom in family instability and in the number of lone mothers, growing up children without a stable partner.
Female employment and poverty
The evidence clearly shows that Italy's high poverty rates depend on the limited support offered to younger households, coupled with very low targeting of social transfers, and the greater incidence of single breadwinner households. The two phenomena combined are responsible for greater concentration of poverty amongst households with workers, and indeed for the high child poverty rates.
The issue of child poverty is usually analysed as a merely static phenomenon: most scholars have rightly stressed out the trend towards decreasing old age poverty and increasing young age poverty (especially infant poverty). The shift of poverty towards younger households should nonetheless be analysed in a more dynamic perspective. In fact, as deprivation and exclusion from acquiring fundamental capabilities tend to concentrate in the earlier part of life-cycle, the risks for individuals to be trapped in permanent poverty and permanent social exclusion are significantly increased -especially in the so called "information society".
While preventing child poverty through better targeting of social spending should obviously be seen as the number one priority of welfare states, the data also show that doubling earning income is the best way of hedging against poverty risks.
Female employment has indeed a crucial role in "squaring the circle": greater female participation reduces -at household level -greater inequality coming from labour markets, increases the active to inactive ratio, with positive feed-backs on welfare states' fiscal revenues and reduces poverty risks amongst household.
Yet female labour market participation is not equally promoted in all welfare systems. It is often argued that in some countries (notably the conservative welfare systems) culture represents a strong barrier to female employment.
Arguably, however, more than culture, nowadays, it is the institutional setting of the welfare regime that shape the patterns of female employment. Where welfare systems rely heavily on the family's care-giving function, women face the difficult trade-offs between paid work and housework, as witnessed by the dramatic drop of employment rates amongst married women with children. Source: Own calculations on LIS micro data sets Employed: having worked at least 27 weeks in the reference year, or receiving maternity leave benefits Table 7 shows female employment rates (all women between 27 and 60 years) disaggregated for household types: couples with no children have been split in two groups in order to try to sort out females who probably have never had children (under 45) from female who might have had children, but whose children no longer live at home. In all countries, amongst single younger women, female employment rates approach 80%, 9 in the case of Italy, quite remarkably, the employment rate almost reaches 90%. Moreover, employments rates tend to be high also amongst older single women.
Leaving aside older married (or cohabitating) women, however, the most evident feature in employment rates' pattern is the difference between women with children and women without children. With the significant exception of Sweden, all countries witness a drop in employment rates which ranges from 12 to almost 30 percentage points.
The possible explanations to such a drop are mainly two: either women in central Europe and in the United Kingdom prefer engaging in unpaid care-giving functions, rather than being employed, or in most countries women face considerable difficulties in combining housework and labour market participation.
Obviously the two alternatives have very different consequences on household welfare: on the one side (i.e. if abstaining from labour market participation were a choice) families may benefit from greater welfare than what may actually be measured using only economic indicators, on the other side, instead, although families would still benefit from internalising important care-giving functions, they would also suffer from the impossibility of expanding their work offer -meaning that women would find themselves in a "family trap", negatively affecting the welfare of the whole household. In graph 5, a rather rough way for testing the different hypothesis is offered. Female employment rates (normalised to average employment rates) amongst married or cohabitating mothers, and married or cohabitating women, have been disaggregated per household disposable income quintiles.
A positive correlation is expected between non-mother female employment rates and household's disposable income.
In the case of married women with children no obvious employment rate distribution was expected ex-ante.
1. Female employment rates may concentrate in lower quintiles, meaning that at a certain income level, when facing a trade-off between housework and employment opportunities, women chose to leave the labour market. 2. Female employment rates may concentrate in higher quintiles, meaning that the trade-off between housework and employment is particularly strong in lower income quintiles, where households do not have the opportunities of externalising important care-giving functions. 3. Female employment rates may be more or less homogeneously distributed amongst all income quintiles, meaning that no trade-off between employment opportunities and housework actually exists and that low employment rates amongst households is mainly due to cultural factors. The graphs clearly show that households' behavioural patterns are strongly dependent on the institutional settings. Sweden distinguishes itself clearly from other countries: as the absence of a significant drop in mothers' employment rates might have suggested, women do not face a trade-off between family care responsibilities and employment opportunities. The employment rates tend, in fact, to be rather homogeneously distributed amongst all income quintiles, both for women with and without children.
In the remaining countries the picture is radically different: Germany, France and the United Kingdom show a hump shape pattern in mothers' employment rates, although the reduction in employment rates in the 5 th quintile is hardly significant. In those countries women probably do face a trade off between family and work, which however disappears at high income levels, where many care-giving functions may be externalised to the market.
The same pattern may be observed in the case of Italy and the Netherlands, although here no reduction is observed in the 5 th quintile. Women without children also show the same pattern in employment rates, although the distribution amongst income quintiles tend to be much smoother.
With reference to female employment, differences between the conservative welfare regimes and the United Kingdom are definitely less visible. Italy too, share the same pattern, but again the data show a much more extreme situation: in the first two income quintiles, where households would most benefits from doubling their income sources, female employment rates hardly reach 40% of mothers' average employment rate. At the same time, where income levels are higher, the employment rate is close to 78% -just one percentage point lower than the Swedish one! The forces underlying this trend are well known: Swedish service-oriented welfare regimes allocate much resources to family services, encouraging households to externalise some care-giving functions at low (or no) costs and cancelling the trade-off typically encountered by women between work and family responsibilities.
In the conservative and liberal welfare state, on the other hand, public services to family tend to be quite limited. Family responsibilities and employment are perceived by most women as non-compatible activities -at least up to a certain income level. In higher disposable income quintiles families probably meet the opportunity of externalising care-giving functions, and employment rates again approach the level of younger single women.
Graph 6 shows the impact of spending on family services on the distribution of employment rates.
Two clusters are clearly formed: the Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Denmark and Finland) on one side, with very high spending on family services and more evenly distributed employments rate, and the liberal and conservative welfare regimes on the other, with low spending on services and more unevenly distributed mothers' employment rates.
Italy's position is quite close to that of other conservative countries and to the British one. Public spending on family services is, however, lowest amongst the latter group of countries and consequently not only are average female employment rates particularly low, but the distribution of employment opportunities amongst households tend to be much more uneven, with negative effects on poverty rates in general and infant poverty in particular. Source: Own calculations on LIS microdata and Esping-Andersen (2000) 
